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PROBATE LAWS--SOME NEEDED CHANGES
By H. D. HENRY of the Colorado Bar
N a day of streamlined trains, which pick up their passengers at the conclusion of the day's business in Denver
and deposit them in Chicago at the beginning of the
next day's business; in a day of fast airplanes, capable of
completely encircling the globe in a period of less than four
days; of radio, which brings instantaneously, to the remotest
parts of the earth, descriptions of events then happening, or,
within the space of a very few minutes, brings accurate reports of things which have happened, of newspapers which
carry, within a few hours, reports of happenings, even pictures of events which have just occurred thousands of miles
away; in a day when creditors are constantly in touch with
their debtors, know their every movement, and know, within
the space of a few hours, of the death of a debtor; when recluses in the most inaccessible parts of the earth are now
better informed by radios, good roads, newspapers, airplanes
and streamlined trains, of world events than were the back
fence gossips of not so long ago; in a day such as this we, in
Colorado, are operating under probate laws which were designed for the period when it took days and weeks for a
lawyer or judge to traverse the territory between county seats;
during a period when the ox cart was more popular than the
automobile; when communication was slow, and when citizens of this great state might go for months without hearing
any of the news of the outside world.
It must have been a delightful experience to administer
estates in the ox cart days, when an Administrator's chief
duties were to count the cows, make a list of them, sell them,
report the same to the Court and, after the expiration of the
one-year period for filing claims, file final report and be discharged.
Prior to the advent of the inheritance tax, with the
necessity of filing a report to the Inheritance Tax Department,
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and subsequently attempting to prove to the Department, in
one or more conferences, the fairness of the executor's valuations; in a time prior to the advent of the Federal estate tax,
with the necessity of filing complicated Federal estate tax returns, computing tax on a complicated scale and having
numerous arguments with numerous Internal Revenue agents,
examiners, technical staff and commissioners, attempting to
convince them of the fairness of the executor's valuations; and
prior to the advent of the Federal income tax law, and its
subsequent changes, which make it necessary for executors to
file such returns in all estates of any size, and have numerous
arguments with various Internal Revenue officials regarding
the correctness of the return and the tax paid; in a day prior
to the advent of the Colorado state income tax law, with the
necessity of filing returns in every estate, of figuring normal
taxes and 2% surtaxes, deductions and exemptions; when an
executor could file an inventory in the County Court, without
standing in mortal fear that the Assessor would eventually
find the inventory, and attempt to tax the $100.00 checking
account of the decedent for ten or fifteen years before, at the
rate of three or four per cent a year, because the decedent had,
following the universal practice of taxpayers, failed to return
such account as a part of his taxable assets; yes, I say, it must
have been a very pleasant experience to administer an estate in
those olden days.
However, we are living in a streamlined age, in an age of
fast communication; in an age of changing conditions and
tremendous responsibilities, and our probate laws should meet
the test of such days, not the test of ox cart days, and, for
that reason, I feel that it is time that our Legislature seriously
undertook the task of streamlining our probate laws.
One thing that needs attention is our statutes regarding
the filing of claims against an estate and setting the normal
administration period. Although, under optional valuation
privileges of the Federal Estate Tax law and the new Colorado
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Inheritance Tax law amendments, the administration period
of large estates cannot be reduced by reducing the time within
which claims can be filed, the period for administering small
and simple estates can be reduced by that method, and executors will be enabled to more quickly determine the financial
status of their estates so that proper and oftentimes much
needed distributions can be made earlier.
I propose a time limit for filing claims of four or six
months. During the past five years, since my admission to the
Bar, virtually all of my work has been the handling of estates
and, naturally, over this period of time I have come in contact with many. To the best of my knowledge, not once in
any of these estates would a period of four or six months have
not been more than sufficient time in which to allow creditors
to file claims. Once in my experience a claim was filed five
days prior to the expiration of the one-year period for filing
claims. The claim was filed by the decedent's landlady, the
first person who knew of his death and who could have filed
a claim within twenty-four hours after the death, if she had
so desired.
There is some question as to whether or not all claims
must be filed within the one-year period. There seems to be
an extensively-held opinion among Denver attorneys that the
one-year period applies only to claims of the fifth class, and
that claims of the other four classes may be filed at any time.
This should certainly be clarified. There is also considerable
doubt as to whether or not contingent claims, or claims which
have not matured, must be filed within the one-year period.
In my opinion, there is no reason why contingent and unmatured claimants cannot file their claims within four or six
months of the decedent's death, providing proper provision is
made for settlement and allowance upon the ripening of the
claim. There is also much question as to what of the various
claim statutes apply to estates of minors and mental incompetents. This matter should also be clarified.
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Adjustment Day is a day of the past. Whatever purpose it might have served in the past, it certainly does not serve
the same purpose at the present time. I propose that an
executor or administrator, upon appointment, run a notice
to creditors, advising them of the appointment, advising them
to file claims and giving the last day upon which claims may
be filed. Such a notice would certainly be sufficient, and
would recognize the passing of the usefulness of Adjustment
Day. Such a notice could be published once a week for four
successive weeks, and could state that claims must be filed
within four or six months from the date of the first publication.
Another difficulty of our present law is that where an
Administrator to Collect is appointed, this appointment does
not start running the time for filing claims, with the result
that, if an Administrator to Collect acts, as he might very
well do, for, say, six months, creditors have actually eighteen
months to file claims. The appointment of an Administrator
to Collect should start running the period for filing claims.
Many minor changes in the claims statutes could be made for
their betterment, but space limits mentioning all of them, and
all statutes which now point to a normal time of administration of one year should be changed to conform to the time as
finally determined by the claim statutes for filing claims.
The statute concerning administration of estates under
$300.00, although very wise in its goal, probably needs some
attention in order to make it absolutely valid. Small changes,
such as a provision for giving notice to creditors, might be
added in such a way as to remedy the objections. It has been
suggested, and very properly, that the amount might be increased to, say $500.00.
The statutes relating to probating wills also need attention. In the first place, the time of notice could probably be
very beneficially reduced. I have often wondered why it is
that anyone except the heirs at law should be entitled to notice
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of probate. Under our present practice, we notify all heirs and
all legatees and devisees, and yet the real reason for the notice
is to give persons who would benefit by the will's being denied
probate an opportunity to be heard. Legatees and devisees,
receiving something which they would not receive otherwise, are not in this position. Notice by publication satisfies
the legal requirements and yet, unless a notice is actually sent
to the persons to whom the notice runs, the notice isn't worth
much. My suggestion would be that a copy of the published
notice be sent by ordinary or registered mail to every person
entitled to such notice.
I think, also, that it is time our Legislature considered
the advisability of adopting a statute relating to living probate.
Under such statutes a testator can go before a proper officer,
be examined as to testamentary capacity and other things, and
the will is then lodged, with a proper official, and, upon the
death of the testator, is immediately probated, without notice
to heirs. A statute could probably be drawn, which would
not only effectuate the purpose of living probate but would
also protect the rights of heirs to have an improperly probated
will set aside.
Another division of our laws which needs attention is
that part relating to the powers of executors. When an executor is given, in the decedent's will, broadest possible powers
for conduct of an estate, transfer agents, and many other classes
of people, abrogate those powers by requiring that Court
approval be obtained of the action. In many states, the executor, after probating the will and filing an inventory, if properly
exempted by the will, is relieved from any -further necessity to
report to or account to, or be under the supervision of, the
probate court, and is allowed to conduct the estate free from
the control of the probate court. I do not, at present, advocate
such a procedure in this State, but I do believe that, when a
testator gives an executor full powers, those powers should
not be limited by the Courts unless contrary to public policy,
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and I believe that our statutes should be so clarified as to confirm in executors such powers as are given by the will.
Testamentary Trusts are a fairly new development. The
rapid growth of testamentary trusts caused at one time the
insertion of a provision in our laws that testamentary trustees
should, unless otherwise provided by the testator, remain under jurisdiction of the County Court. The duties, powers
and liabilities of such trustees were set forth in one small
clause, which states that testamentary trustees shall have the
powers, duties and liabilities of executors. Now, a testamentary trustee cannot logically be subject to all of the duties
and liabilities of an executor. There is no reason for giving
notice to creditors; the statutory sale of real estate is clearly
not applicable to the position of a testamentary trustee; there
is no reason for doing numerous things that would be required
of a testamentary trustee under such a provision. For that
reason, I believe, the powers, duties and liabilities of testamentary trustees should be carefully considered and fully set
forth in the statutes. When a testamentary trust is not under
jurisdiction of the Court, there is some question as to what
must be done. May he file an oath and bond, and is he then
relieved from the jurisdiction of the Court, or, does he proceed without filing an oath and bond? It would be good sense
to fully and adequately set forth the exact status of a testamentary trustee.
Many of our various sections, written at different times,
cause conflicts in regard to the various details of similar procedures in different instances; for example, there is the procedure of determination of heirship. There are three separate
provisions under which heirship can be determined. In these
three provisions there are variances relating to notice, relating
to the time in which the petition must be filed; relating to the
time after which the decree may be entered, and other things,
with the result that the poor lawyer must remember three
separate procedures, whereas, with proper correlation, there
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would be the necessity for remembering only one procedure.
Scattered through our probate statutes are various provisions relating to fiduciary bonds. All of these various sections could be eliminated by one simple section, which provided
simply that the executor or administrator must, at all times,
have on file with the Court a bond, sufficient in amount adequately to protect the estate as to all personal property and
the proceeds from the rental or sale of real property which may
come into the executors hands, and that if, at any time, it
appears that the bond is inadequate, it must be made adequate.
It might also be noted that there are many provisions
relating to notices; that most of the provisions are conflicting
and that, of the various notices required by the probate laws,
there are different periods for each kind of notice. There might
be some justification for having some variation between various types of notices, but there is no reason why they should
not be the same in most cases.
The so-called "Statutory Sale of Real Estate" is the
hoodoo of many executors. We are living in a day when real
estate transactions must be made quickly. Both agents and
purchasers wish a sale to be completed within two or three
days of the time the offer is made. Probably most executors
do not start a statutory sale proceeding until an offer is actually received, and it is very difficult for purchasers and agents
to understand why it is necessary for some two months to
elapse while the property is being appraised and while the
court is being petitioned for sale, while notice is being published to non-resident heirs, and the time required for such
notice is running, and then while the order for sale is being
entered by the Court upon testimony of the executor and,
after the sale, it must be confirmed by the Court. I dare say
that when an abstract is submitted to you for an examination,
you make it the first order of business, because,- if you do not,
the prospective purchaser will be calling you, continuously
and excitedly, to know why it can't be rushed right through.
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I live in mortal fear of the day when my phone will
ring, and I will pick it up to hear a conversation something
like this: "Mr. John Doe died this morning. I have a buyer
for his house. Can we close the deal this afternoon?" and
then I must explain that it is necessary for appraisers to be appointed, for the court to be petitioned, for notice to run to
heirs, devisees and legatees, and that, in all probability, the
sale cannot be completed for two months' time. This long
period of time between offer and completion of the sale seems
long and useless to our present day real estate purchasers and
agents who are used to doing business in a period of hours,
not months, and it does seem to me that any procedure which
requires so much time is. not in keeping with our present idea
of speed and fast communication.
These points are, in my opinion, the main points which
need revision, and which will materially assist in the simplification of estate administration. Many other points need
attention, such as the sections providing for the concurrent
jurisdiction of District and County Courts, when the constitution specifically gives this jurisdiction to the County
Court; there is, of course, the section which talks about children and descendants of children of the half-blood, the appearance of which history does not record. There is also the
question of the election and allowance of an insane widow.
In spite of our mandatory law, it would seem that an insane
widow may, without a Conservator, have the right of election
after the six months' period may have expired. This should
be clarified in such a manner that the widow would adequately
be protected and yet that the right of election would not exist
forever.
Of the present 255 sections of Chapter 176, very likely
most of them need attention, but someone must start now and
-campaign vigorously and continuously until such changes are
adopted as will enable the executor or administrator to administer an estate from the technical standpoint as simply as
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possible. Problems of investments, taxation and the increasing number and complication of reports necessary to be made,
disposition of the assets and settlement with the heirs and
beneficiaries, are so great that the executor or administrator
should be given as much relief as possible from unnecessary
and burdensome details of administration.
Colorado has not shown itself adverse to advisable
changes in either substantive law or rules of procedure. Kansas
and other states have recently revised their probate laws, bringing them up to date. Louisiana has adopted a new Trust
Estates Act, embodying many very desirable features. With
this spirit of change so widely manifested, the Colorado Probate Code should receive early attention.

Repealing Obsolete Laws
The Illinois Legislature recently inaugurated a campaign to remove
obsolete legislation from their statute books, with the result that there
was achieved the mass repeal of 402 acts and parts of acts that had long
outlived their usefulness.
Many of the laws repealed were old validating acts and appropriation measures, others outlived by the advance of time and the progress
of civilization, and some related to the Chicago Sanitary district, state
parks, state institutions, railroads, taxes, highways, and public health.
The search for these obsolete laws was not without some humor.
One act repealed was passed in 1897 and prohibited "long continued
and brutal bicycle riding." Another prohibited "fraud in the sale of
lard," and an act to prevent "the sale of renovated butter" was found.
Apparently the oldest of the bills repealed was "an act to afford relief
to total abstinence societies" which was enacted in this state on May
20, 1879.
Of more pertinent concern were the act to prohibit "false advertising in the purchase of Liberty bonds," other measures providing "relief
to Illinois flood sufferers," and penalties against "nuisances at the World's
Fair." One act was found making it a misdemeanor "to sell or give away
toy pistols," and another act purported "to secure all persons freedom
in the selection of an occupation, profession or employment."
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This statute housecleaning process was accomplished by Senate
Bills 375 and 435, the first measures of their kind to be introduced in
the Illinois legislature since 1874. The Statutes of Illinois in 1819
were contained in a volume of 375 pages: when these repealing acts were
introduced by Senator Hickman, the volume had grown to 3,743 pages.
The removal of these 402 useless and obsolete acts is expected to effect
a material reduction in the size of the Illinois Revised Statutes and thus
assist the active law practitioner who must make constant use of the
volume. "Illinois Bar Journal, Sept., 1919."
Colorado could well afford to have a committee of the next legislature with a similar end in view.

Discrimination in Respect to "Hire"
The National Labor Relations Board recently ordered an employer
to give "back pay" to two union members who had never been employed
by the company. The basis of the Board's holding was that the employer, in failing to hire these men, had discriminated against them in
respect to their hire and had thus discouraged union membership. The
period of "back pay" ran for more than two years, since the men applied
for work in July, -1937. The Board overruled the employer's contention
that the refusal to employ these men was also due to their lack of experience on the particular machines to be used, the advanced age of the
applicants, and the fact that they already were employed elsewhere. The
employer also argued that there were several applicants for each position
available at the time. (In re Waumbec Mills, Inc., 15 NLRB, No. 4,
Sept. 1, 1939.) (N. Y. State Bar Assn., Lawyer Service Letter Oct.
18, 1939.)

NEGLIGENCE
HOLC Not Immune
The Court of Appeals has affirmed the order in the Gillen case
(digested supra, p. 117) holding that when the HOLC owns, manages,
and leases real property it engages in a proprietary function and is therefore not immune in tort for damage claims arising out of a tenant's personal injuries. (Gillen v.HOLC, Ct. of App., May 16, 1939.) Accord, Keifer & Keifer tv. RFC, 59 S. Ct. 516. (N. Y. State Bar Ass'n
Letter, May, 1939.)
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PRESIDENT APPOINTS STANDING COMMITTEES
FOR STATE BAR

W

M. R. KELLY of Greeley, President of the Colorado
Bar Association, announces with this issue of Dicta
the appointment of all standing committees of the
Association. The appointments are made in accordance with
the recent amendments to the by-laws adopted in the 1939
annual meeting.

These amendments provide that each affiliated association
designates ten members for each representative on the Board
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of Governors as eligible for committee membership. From
those so designated, the president selects all the standing committees. Each standing committee is composed of five members except the committee on judicial procedure. This committee according to the by-laws is composed of four district
court judges, two county court judges, and a representative
from each affiliated association not represented by a judge.
The membership is divided into active members who carry
on the bulk of the committees work, and the remaining members act in an advisory and liaison capacity.
In order to establish continuity of committee work a
portion of those designated serve for two years. In the list
of committee appointments which follow the figure "two"
after a name means that that member serves until 1941.
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